Below are given the usual tables showing the sources from which seven successive classes have been drawn, both as to previous college training and as to the geographical districts from which the students have come: —

HARVARD GRADUATES.

Class of	From Massachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.
1893	34	1	19	54
1894	30	2	17	49
1895	32	4	13	49
1896	23	7	17	47
1897	27	2	15	44
1898	42	1	25	68
1899	45	6	19	70

GRADUATES OF OTHER COLLEGES.

Class of	From Massachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.
1893	5	9	21	35
1894	7	20	38	65
1895	8	14	30	52
1896	14	11	45	70
1897	9	12	56	77
1898	19	23	62	104
1899	21	12	45	78

HOLDING NO DEGREE.

Class of	From Massachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.	Total of Class.
1893	4	1	7	12	101
1894	20	1	10	31	142
1895	16	3	14	33	135
1896	10	4	9	23	140
1897	26	7	16	49	170
1898	25	2	25	52	224
1899	11	2	8	21	169

The following thirty-five colleges have conferred their first degrees on members of the entering class, the figures indicating the number of men from each college, where more than one: Amherst (9), Yale (9), Princeton (7), Brown (6), Bowdoin (4), Leland Stanford (4), Bates (3), Cornell (3), De Pauw (3), Dartmouth (2), Knox (2), Mass. Institute of Technology (2), Union (2), University of Alabama, Boston College, University of California, University of Chicago, Colgate, Dalhousie, Georgetown, Hillsdale, Holy Cross, Iowa, Johns Hopkins, Lake Forest, Louisiana, McGill, Middlebury, Oberlin, Ohio State University, Trinity, Vanderbilt, University of Vermont, Williams, and North Western.

A significant fact, showing a continued increase in the earnestness of the men who come to the School, is that the percentage of men withdrawing or not taking examinations very steadily decreases. Last year but eight per cent of the first year and three per cent of the second year men were placed in this list.

PREFERENCE OF VETERANS IN THE MASSACHUSETTS CIVIL SERVICE. — The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, having disallowed as clearly unreasonable the proposition that any veteran, however unfit, must have any office, however necessary its duties might make fitness (*Brown* v.

Russell, 166 Mass. 14; see 10 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 119), the Legislature has tried again. That it should do this so promptly suggests the spirit of Mr. Theodore Roosevelt's contemporary in the New York Legislature who "did his best not to allow the Constitution to come between friends"; but it has this difference, that a real and satisfactory attempt has been made to avoid the faults which vitiated the earlier law, and the result seems to be a preference which can honorably be advocated and justified. And such is the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court which the Legislature has obtained on the validity of the new law (44 N. E. Rep. 625).

"The General Court may have been of the opinion," say the majority of the court, "that a person who had served in the army . . . would be likely to possess courage, constancy, and habits of obedience and fidelity, which are valuable qualifications for any public office or employment." Whether this is in fact the intention, and will in fact be the result of the law, are questions which are not for any court to decide, and questions which the majority rightly do not take up. It would seem that the minority (Allen, Lathrop, and Barker, JJ.) put it too strongly when they say that the new law (chapter 517 of 1896) "involves a compulsory disregard of actual fitness." The distinguishing and saving difference of the new law is that every appointee, be he veteran or no, must pass his examination; he must exceed that minimum which the Civil Service Rules fix as a sufficient test of knowledge. Then, and then only, the very arguable proposition that his service may help to fit him is to come into play. Whether or no one approves such a law, it would seem to be well within the bounds of any liberal interpretation of the Massachusetts Constitution. There is indeed one section of the new law (§ 3) which would make it possible for an appointing officer deliberately to disregard his duty; but the court having determined that with a proper construction it merely leaves the responsibility with him, without requiring him to consider anything but capacity, the section is as easy to sustain as the rest, whatever loopholes it may have been meant to leave.

CERTAINTY AS A FORMAL REQUISITE OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER. — Two cases recently decided on the same day by the Supreme Court of Michigan afford excellent illustrations of the sort of certainty that is to-day regarded as requisite in negotiable paper. In *Brooke* v. *Struthers*, 68 N. W. Rep. 272, a provision in a mortgage, that, if the mortgagor should leave any taxes unpaid for thirty days, such taxes and the principal and interest of the note accompanying the mortgage, should at once become payable, was held to render the note non-negotiable. In *Wilson* v. *Campbell*, Ibid. 278, under similar circumstances, the note was held to be negotiable, because, at the time of its execution, there was a statute in existence requiring the mortgagor to pay the taxes, and hence the stipulation in the mortgage added nothing to the amount payable on the note.

That a note and a mortgage executed at the same time must be construed together, is well settled. Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 156. The two cases are distinguishable only on the ground that the element of uncertainty in the amount payable on the note, which existed in the first case, was not present in the second. In uncertainty of the time of payment, the cases are alike. As an original question of princi-